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LAW AND THE BOUNDARIES OF  
TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE FIRMS 
OREN BAR-GILL† & GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY††
The boundaries of technology-intensive firms are determined not only by 
economic considerations, but also by legal constraints.  The law plays a dual 
role:  First, by granting property right protection to certain types of information 
and withholding such protection from others, the law determines which innova-
tions will be organized under a property-rights-based model and which will be 
organized by means of access control and restrictions on employee mobility.  
When information is protected by property rights, the optimal organization of 
innovation answers the question, “Who should own the innovation?”  When 
information is not protected by property rights, this basic question becomes 
meaningless, and other sources of control—like access to the innovation and 
contractual restrictions on employee mobility—come to the fore.  This brings us 
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to the second role that law plays in drawing the boundaries of technology-
intensive firms.  In the absence of property rights in the innovation, covenants 
not to compete (CNCs) become critical in determining incentives and overall 
efficiency.  The law imposes substantial restrictions on the scope and substance 
of CNCs.  In some cases it is legal doctrine, rather than economic considera-
tions, that determines the organization of innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION
The theory of the firm asks when an intermediate good should be 
produced in-house and when it should be purchased on the market 
from an upstream supplier.  In technology-intensive industries, one of 
the central intermediate goods is information or innovation.  The ques-
tion thus becomes which stages of the inventive process should be in-
tegrated in a single firm and which should be divided among different 
firms and traded on the market.  The theoretical investigation of the 
optimal boundary between firm and market cannot be carried out in a 
legal vacuum.  Ideally, only economic considerations should affect the 
“make or buy” decision.  In practice, however, law imposes an impor-
tant constraint on the economic balance between firms and markets. 
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We focus on the property rights theory of the firm pioneered by 
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore1 and applied to the 
innovation context by Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole.2  Aghion and 
Tirole show both when integration is efficient and when nonintegra-
tion is efficient.  Their analysis realistically assumes that “the exact na-
ture of the innovation is ill-defined ex ante and the two parties cannot 
contract for delivery of a specific innovation.”3  But Aghion and Tirole 
also assume that the contract can specify “the allocation of the property
right on any forthcoming innovation.”4
Implicit in Aghion and Tirole’s framework is the notion that 
property rights in the innovation are legally recognized.  Is it necessar-
ily the case that innovation is protected by property rights?  The as-
sumption that property rights in the intermediate good are legally 
recognized is, in many contexts, completely innocuous.  Obviously, 
the law recognizes property rights in the proverbial widget.  But this 
key assumption is not innocuous in the innovation context.  Legal 
1 See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
(1995); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:  A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). 
2 Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. ECON.
1185 (1994).  The property rights theory is not the only possible framework for study-
ing the boundaries of technology-intensive firms.  Early contributions in the tradition 
of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) include OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES 127-28 (1975), which pioneered and developed TCE theory that focuses 
on the ex post bureaucracy costs of integration; David J. Teece, Profiting from Techno-
logical Innovation:  Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 
RES. POL’Y 285, 288-96 (1986) [hereinafter Teece, Profiting from Technological Innova-
tion], who argued that when innovation is easy, a firm’s ability to profit from innova-
tion may depend on its ability to control assets complementary to innovations, such as 
manufacturing or distribution; and David J. Teece, Technological Change and the Nature 
of the Firm, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 256, 256-81 (Giovanni Dosi 
et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Teece, Technological Change].  The importance of appro-
priability and its relationship with intellectual property rights was first emphasized in 
Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra, at 287.  Arora et al. highlight the 
difficulty in contracting over tacit knowledge and know-how, noting “the role of pat-
ents in facilitating transactions in technology.”  ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR 
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 262 
(2001).  Scott Masten provides a detailed account of the distinct features of the legal 
rules governing the employment relationship of firms.  See Scott E. Masten, A Legal Ba-
sis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 185-89 (1988) (noting the duties, obligations, 
sanctions, and procedures under such legal rules). 
3 Aighon & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186. 
4 Id. at 1189. 
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doctrine is continuously struggling to define what classes of informa-
tion are worthy of property right protection.5
This is not to say that most types of innovation are not legally pro-
tected.  Probably most types of economically valuable innovation are 
protected by property rights.  Accordingly, Aghion and Tirole’s model 
clearly covers a broad class of cases.  But, we argue, there is another 
class of cases that the Aghion and Tirole model does not cover—cases 
where the innovation is not protected by property rights.  Aghion and 
Tirole derived the optimal organization of innovation, assuming le-
gally recognized property rights in the innovation.  How would inno-
vation be organized absent such property rights?  We answer this ques-
tion, emphasizing the differences between the organization of 
innovation with and without property rights.  These differences under-
score the important effect of legal policy—which determines the scope 
of property right protection—on the organization of innovation.6
To study the organization of innovation in the absence of prop-
erty rights, we revert back to the notion of control that underlies the 
5 See infra Part II. 
6 While Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, and the literature that builds on their 
analysis assume that the innovation is protected by property rights, another strand in 
the literature adopts the opposite assumption.  These authors and others recognize 
that property rights in information are often imperfect or even nonexistent, and pro-
ceed to study how the innovator can extract value from a downstream customer in the 
absence of property rights.  See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inven-
tions:  Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190, 191-92 
(1994) [hereinafter Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions] (arguing that despite 
the risk of expropriation, a financially weak independent inventor selling an invention 
for which no property rights exist can nonetheless appropriate a sizable share of the 
market value of the invention by revealing the invention to an informed buyer); James 
J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Start-Ups, Spin-Offs, and Internal Projects, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
362, 363 (1995) [hereinafter Anton & Yao, Start-Ups] (examining the “incentive con-
flict” facing an employee who discovers a private innovation for which no property 
rights exist and must choose between keeping the innovation private or disclosing the 
innovation to the employer); Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the 
Market for “Ideas”:  Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL’Y
333, 348 (2003) (finding that “when weak intellectual property for innovation exists 
alongside low barriers to entry, competitive commercialization strategies are more 
likely”); Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, Curb Your Innovation:  Corporate Conser-
vatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights 11-20 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 4466, 2004), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/ 
dps/DP4466.asp (considering the same spin-off-or-disclose dilemma facing employees 
creating innovations with imperfect property rights examined in Anton & Yao, Start-
Ups, supra, and examining the effects of various employer attributes on the efficiency 
of spinning-off or disclosing).  These papers, however, do not ask the “boundaries of 
the firm” question (at least not within the framework of the property rights theory of 
the firm). 
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property rights theory of the firm.  We argue that control can exist, 
and be allocated, even absent property rights.  We focus on two alter-
native sources of control:  access to the innovation and contractual re-
strictions on employee mobility. 
The first, nonproperty source of control is access to the innova-
tion.7  We define “nonintegration” as the case where the research unit 
can withhold knowledge of the innovation from the customer, and 
“integration” as the case where the existence and substance of the in-
novation are known by both the research unit and the customer.  Un-
der our definitions of access-based organization, the research unit 
may enjoy control via exclusive access in the nonintegration case.  The 
real power that access provides is determined by the choices available 
to the research unit.  Specifically, can the research unit (RU) extract 
surplus from the customer (C) without relinquishing control—that is, 
without disclosing the innovation to the customer?8
In many cases the answer is no.  If RU cannot develop the innova-
tion itself and must sell it to a customer, then the two parties engage 
in bargaining under asymmetric information—bargaining that may 
7 But see Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy:  A 
Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, 116 Q.J. ECON. 805, 841 (2001) [hereinafter 
Rajan & Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy] (defining control as “the right to 
determine current access,” as compared to ownership, “which gives the owner the right 
to determine access now and in the future”).  Rajan and Zingales observe that the 
Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory “does not deem current access neces-
sary in any way (ownership is important only in that it helps control future access).”  Id.
We are not the first to study the role of access in a theory of the firm that is founded 
on notions of contractual incompleteness and control.  Rajan and Zingales emphasize 
the role of access in organizational design.  See id. at 813, 841 (focusing on access as a 
mechanism for allocating power within a firm); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 
Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 388 (1998); see also Krishnamurthy 
Subramanian, A Theory of Financing of Ideas 3-5 ( July 2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors) (focusing specifically on modeling access to ideas).  The 
notion of access adopted in this paper also relates to the notion of real authority de-
veloped by Aghion and Tirole.  See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Au-
thority in Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (1997) (describing real authority as “an 
effective control over decisions”).  Hvide relates organizational structure to the em-
ployer’s knowledge about “the progress and content of the projects the workers are 
engaged in,” arguing that in smaller firms the employer is better informed; the em-
ployer’s knowledge depends on access as determined by the organizational structure 
or firm size.  Hans K. Hvide, The Quality of Entrepreneurs, 119 ECON. J. (forthcoming 
2009) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=545144.  Gans and 
Stern refer to secrecy as an informal appropriability mechanism, as compared to for-
mal intellectual property rights.  See Gans & Stern, supra note 6, at 335. 
8 Following Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186, we call the upstream creator of 
the information (or the inventor) the “research unit” and the downstream user of the 
information (who may proceed to develop it further) the “customer.” 
1654 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1649
well result in impasse.  As Kenneth Arrow famously observed, informa-
tion that is not afforded legal protection cannot be bought or sold on 
the market.  Absent legal protection, the information holder is in a 
bind:  in order to sell the information, she must disclose it to the po-
tential buyer, but once she does, she has nothing left to sell.9
Faced with the disclosure paradox, often the best that RU can do 
is disclose the innovation to C, free of charge, and then bargain under 
conditions of symmetric information.  As Anton and Yao show, RU
may still be able to extract a significant portion of the surplus from C
even after disclosing the innovation to C by threatening to disclose the 
innovation to C ’s competitors.10  Since the best strategy for RU is to 
disclose the innovation to C, the fact that RU initially enjoyed exclu-
sive access to the innovation is meaningless, and the distinction be-
tween integration and nonintegration collapses. 
There are circumstances, however, where access does imply actual 
control and can thus provide a basis for a theory of organizational de-
sign.  First, there are cases where RU will choose to negotiate with C
before disclosing the innovation despite the disclosure paradox.11
Second, when RU can develop the innovation itself,12 access improves 
RU ’s bargaining position and thus implies control.  Third, in some 
cases, RU can disclose only part of the innovation to C and then bar-
gain with C for a share of the surplus larger than what it could obtain 
9 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search ed., 1962) (“In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . 
simply sell information on the open market.  Any one purchaser can destroy the mo-
nopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little or no cost.”); see also Anton & 
Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 191 (“[I]f the inventor first reveals 
information regarding the invention, a lack of property rights makes it possible for the 
newly informed party to ‘steal’ or ‘expropriate’ the invention.”). 
10 Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 192 (arguing that a 
contract between RU and C may be negotiated at this point to garner benefits); see also
Baccara & Razin, supra note 6, at 1-4 (discussing possible choices and outcomes for RU).
11 See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 191 (noting that 
an inventor could negotiate without disclosing the innovation, but buyers are under-
standably “hesitant to buy . . . an unknown commodity”). 
12 See Anton & Yao, Start-Ups, supra note 6, at 363 (noting that an employee who 
develops a reproducible innovation can leave the firm and start a new company); see 
also Gans & Stern, supra note 6, at 336 (observing that an innovator’s profitability de-
pends, in part, on her ability to establish market presence). 
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after full disclosure.13  Finally, in some cases RU can leverage access 
and force C to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA). 
We characterize the optimal access-based organization of innova-
tion and compare social welfare under access-based organization with 
welfare when property rights in the innovation are recognized and the 
organization of innovation can be based on the allocation of these 
property rights.  We show that the organization of innovation, and its 
welfare consequences, depends on the legal policy that sets the scope 
of intellectual property rights. 
The second, nonproperty source of control derives from contrac-
tual restrictions on employee mobility or covenants not to compete 
(CNCs).  CNCs are easy for courts to enforce even in an environment 
fraught with noncontractibility (like the innovation environment).  
Oliver Hart observed that in technology-intensive industries, the firm’s 
“source of value may consist of as little as . . . a contract that prohibits 
[the firm’s] workers from working for competitors.”14
Nonhuman assets are the source of control in the property rights 
theory.  The emphasis on nonhuman assets is motivated by “the ab-
sence of slavery,”15 which implies that control over human assets is in-
alienable and thus cannot be allocated.  The important role of CNCs, 
as recognized by Hart, suggests that, at least in technology-intensive 
sectors, nonhuman assets are not the only, and perhaps not the main, 
source of control.  Control over human assets can be allocated.  Of 
course, the reach of CNCs is limited.  And it is the law that sets the 
limit, taking into consideration, among other things, the inalienability 
concerns raised by Hart. 
CNCs differ from the standard assets that serve as a source of con-
trol in yet another way.  The standard assets are discrete.  A machine is 
either owned by A or by B.16  CNCs, on the other hand, allocate con-
trol in a continuous manner.  The strength of a CNC depends on its 
geographical and temporal reach—both continuous dimensions.  
13 See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, The Sale of Ideas:  Strategic Disclosure, Property 
Rights, and Contracting, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 513, 514-15 (2002) (describing how, in 
competitive markets, partial disclosure can drive up an innovator’s profits). 
14 HART, supra note 1, at 57. 
15 Id. at 29. 
16 Joint ownership is also possible.  Joint ownership may seem to allow for a con-
tinuous allocation of control, similar to the type that we attributed to CNCs.  See infra
text accompanying notes 54-56.  The ownership shares can be continuous:  A can own 
X% and B can own (100 – X)%.  But these continuous-ownership shares do not trans-
late into a continuous allocation of control:  either one party has decision rights or 
each party has veto power. 
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Stronger CNCs increase the customer’s control and thus enhance her 
incentives to invest.  At the extreme, a very powerful CNC can mimic 
the incentives generated when the innovation is protected by property 
rights and these rights are allocated to C (the integration case).17  A 
CNC, as a continuous contracting variable, allows the parties to opti-
mally calibrate incentives, at least within certain bounds.18
As suggested above, one such bound is defined by the law.  The 
law imposes an upper bound on the strength of enforceable CNCs.  
When the marginal efficiency of the customer’s investment is small 
enough relative to that of the research unit’s investment, this con-
straint is not binding.  But when the marginal efficiency of the cus-
tomer’s investment is large enough relative to that of the research 
unit’s investment, this legal constraint is binding.  In these cases, the 
organization of innovation is determined by legal, not economic,  
considerations.19
The law thus plays a dual role.  First, by setting the scope of prop-
erty right protection, it selects between property-based organization of 
innovation and CNC-based organization of innovation.  We emphasize 
the differences between these two forms of organization and the wel-
fare consequences of these differences.  Second, when one arm of the 
law precludes property-based organization, a second arm of the law 
determines, in some cases, the specific organizational structure by lim-
iting the range of enforceable CNCs. 
The burden of this paper is to identify and begin to explore the 
central role that the law plays in setting the boundaries of technology-
17 At the other extreme, a very weak noncompete clause brings us back to the out-
come described in the case where the innovation is not legally protected.  The em-
ployee’s incentives to invest in this scenario can be very weak (depending on the effect 
of the employee’s threat to leave and go work for a competitor).  In particular, while 
we associate weak noncompete clauses with nonintegration, the incentives that such 
nonintegration provides for employees can be much weaker than the incentives pro-
vided to employees when the innovation is protected by property rights and these 
rights are allocated to the employee (as in the nonintegration case). 
18 Cf. Eric A. Posner et al., Investing in Human Capital:  The Efficiency of Covenants 
Not to Compete 3 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Work-
ing Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
uvalwps/olin/art11 (arguing that the scope of the CNC is set to induce privately, but 
not socially, optimal incentives to invest in human capital). 
19 As described infra Part II, successful innovation can occur in the absence of en-
forceable CNCs.  The prime example is the success of Silicon Valley despite the refusal of 
California law to enforce CNCs.  In certain cases (or places) there may be other forces 
outside of our model that enable efficient innovation absent CNCs.  This observation, 
however, does not undermine our analysis.  In many other cases (or places), CNCs are 
important and the law’s restrictions on CNCs affect the organization of innovation. 
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intensive firms.  As suggested above, the law plays a dual role:  First, 
once we realize that property rights in innovation should not be taken 
for granted, it becomes clear that the legal determination of which 
categories of information will be protected by property rights has a di-
rect effect on the boundaries of the firm question.  Specifically, the 
basic question “who should own the innovation?” becomes meaning-
less, and other sources of control, like access to the innovation and 
contractual restrictions on employee mobility, come to the fore.  This 
brings us to the second role that law plays in drawing the boundaries 
of technology-intensive firms.  In the absence of property rights in the 
innovation, CNCs become critical in determining incentives and over-
all efficiency.  The law imposes substantial restrictions on the scope 
and substance of CNCs.  In some cases these legal constraints, rather 
than economic considerations, determine the strength of the CNC 
and thus the organization of innovation. 
In addition to the various strands of literature surveyed above, this 
paper relates to several recent contributions exploring the role of law, 
and specifically the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs), in set-
ting the boundaries of technology-intensive firms.  Arora and Merges 
argue that stronger IPRs contribute to the viability of small, special-
ized firms, and thus favor independent suppliers over vertical integra-
tion.20  Arora and Merges, however, “neglect[] the possibility that a 
captive supplier could quit the parent firm and join a rival [or start a 
new firm].”21  We incorporate this possibility in our analysis, and we 
thus reach more nuanced conclusions about the relationship between 
IPRs and firm boundaries.22
20 Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm 
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 451 (2004); see also Ashish Arora & Alfonso 
Gambardella, The Changing Technology of Technological Change:  General and Abstract 
Knowledge and the Division of Innovative Labour, 23 RES. POL’Y 523, 529 n.13 (1994) (not-
ing that strong intellectual property rights have encouraged specialization in fields 
such as biotechnology); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets, 
and the Value of Intangible Assets 3-4 (Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/iprights.pdf (call-
ing IPRs the “crown jewels” of small firms). 
21 Arora & Merges, supra note 20, at 456. 
22 Also, much of the analysis in Arora & Merges, supra note 20, can be interpreted 
as proposing one way to minimize the costs associated with the disclosure paradox—
through intellectual property rights in complementary assets.  See also ARORA ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 116-17 (noting that an innovator can protect herself by withholding 
the “know-how” of complementary technology).  Our focus, on the other hand, is on 
intellectual property rights in core informational assets. 
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Burk and McDonnell offer a detailed account of how different 
doctrines of intellectual property law affect the relative costs of inte-
gration and nonintegration.23  Their main argument is that the law 
should avoid excessively strong IPRs.24  This conclusion follows from 
their assumption about the stickiness of IPRs.  Specifically, they as-
sume that if the law initially allocates strong property rights to C, it will 
be costly to reallocate these rights (or some of them) to RU.25  Without 
denying that the reallocation of property rights may be costly, we be-
lieve that it is useful to begin with the benchmark assumption, 
adopted in much of the property rights literature, that if the law rec-
ognizes property rights in the innovation, the cost of allocating or re-
allocating these rights between the parties is low. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Part I studies 
the organization of innovation absent legally recognized property 
rights, and demonstrates the important role that law plays in setting 
the boundaries of technology-intensive firms.  Part II provides a brief 
and selective summary of the relevant legal doctrines.  We begin by 
surveying the law that determines the range of innovations that are af-
forded property right protection and can thus be organized based on 
the allocation of these property rights.  We then describe the law gov-
erning CNCs, which, as explained above, determines, in some cases, 
the specific organizational structure.  A brief conclusion follows. 
I. ORGANIZING INNOVATION WITHOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS
The organization of innovation depends on whether the law rec-
ognizes property rights in the innovation.  Some categories of innova-
tion enjoy property right protection, while others do not.  Since 
Aghion and Tirole have studied the organization of innovation under 
the assumption that property rights in innovation are legally recog-
nized,26 we focus on those categories of innovation that do not enjoy 
property right protection.27
23 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:  Balancing Intellec-
tual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575. 
24 Id. at 577. 
25 Id. at 597-600. 
26 Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186-87 (noting the focus on the legal features 
of research and development). 
27 In some cases assets complementary to the unprotected innovation are legally 
protected.  These assets can be used both conceptually—to define the boundaries of 
the firm—and substantively as a means for RU to extract surplus from C. See, e.g., Arora 
& Merges, supra note 20, at 453 (calling complementary assets a “safeguard”); Teece, 
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A.  Framework of Analysis 
We adopt the basic structure of the Aghion and Tirole model.28 RU
performs research for C.  The expected value of the innovation for the 
customer (i.e., the probability of discovery multiplied by the value of 
the innovation conditional upon discovery), V(e, E) > 0, depends on 
the noncontractible investment e by RU and on the noncontractible 
investment E by C.  The exact nature of the innovation (i.e., the prod-
uct of RU’s efforts) is ill defined ex ante and thus noncontractible. 
The ex ante noncontractibility implies that incentives to invest will 
be determined by the ex post division of the surplus V(e, E) between 
the two parties.  Let  [0,1] denote the share of ex post surplus that 
goes to C.  A higher  implies stronger incentives for C and corre-
spondingly weaker incentives for RU.
We focus on ex ante efficiency, which depends on the relative effi-
ciency of the parties’ investments.  Let [0, ) denote the relative 
efficiency of the parties’ investments, such that a higher  means that 
C’s investments are relatively more efficient as compared to RU’s in-
vestments.  Optimally, when  is higher,  will also be higher in order to 
provide stronger incentives to C, whose investment is more important.  
And when is lower, the optimal  will also be lower in order to provide 
stronger incentives to RU, whose investment is more important. 
B.  With Property Rights:  The Aghion and Tirole Model 
Aghion and Tirole assume that innovation is protected by prop-
erty rights.  In the Aghion and Tirole Model (A-T model), the ex ante 
contract specifies the allocation of property rights on any forthcoming 
innovation.29  Specifically, Aghion and Tirole consider two possible al-
Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 2, at 288-91 (describing complemen-
tary assets and calling them a “critical” bargaining chip).  Following Aghion and Tirole, 
supra note 2, we focus on cases where there are no significant complementary assets. 
28 Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186-87.  We present a bare-bones version of 
the Aghion and Tirole model, abstracting from many important features of their 
model.  We generalize the Aghion and Tirole model in one dimension in particular:  
while Aghion and Tirole assume that the value of the innovation V is exogenous, we 
allow V to depend on the parties’ investments.  This generalization helps demonstrate 
the effect of organizational structure in the absence of property rights in the innova-
tion.  See infra subsection II.A.5. 
29 That is the only relevant factor in the contract.  The contract can also specify a 
sharing rule on the verifiable revenue (license fee) obtained by the research unit, but 
Aghion and Tirole demonstrate that the sharing rule is irrelevant.  See Aghion & Ti-
role, supra note 2, at 1193; see also HART, supra note 1, at 79 (observing that revenue- or 
cost-sharing contracts do not force either party to trade under the contract). 
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locations:  (1) C-ownership or integration, where the property rights on 
the innovation are allocated to C, and (2) RU-ownership or nonintegra-
tion, where the property rights on the innovation are allocated to RU.
They show that under integration, C’s expected payoff is V(e, E)
and RU’s expected payoff is 0.30  Under nonintegration, both C’s and 
RU’s expected payoffs are ½ × V(e, E).  With property rights in the in-
novation, we have IntP  = 1 and 
NInt
P  = ½, where the P subscript de-
notes the existence of property rights and the superscripts Int and 
NInt denote integration and nonintegration, respectively. 
C. Contractible Allocation of Property Rights in a  
Noncontractible Innovation 
The main goal of this paper is to study the organization of innova-
tion when the innovation is not protected by property rights.  Namely, 
while Aghion and Tirole assume the existence of property rights in 
innovation, we will adopt the opposite assumption.  We will show that 
innovation will be organized differently with and without property 
rights.  We will then argue that since the law determines what catego-
ries of innovation receive property right protection, the law influences 
the organization of innovation. 
Before embarking on an analysis of the optimal organization of 
innovation without property rights, we consider the consistency of the 
Aghion and Tirole framework with recognized property rights.  
Aghion and Tirole assume that the innovation is not contractible.  But 
if “the exact nature of the innovation is ill defined ex ante,”31 how can 
the parties allocate property rights in the innovation?  In the basic 
property rights model,32 the parties allocate property rights not in the 
intermediate good itself but rather in the nonhuman assets used ei-
ther to produce the intermediate good or to utilize the intermediate 
good in the production of the final product.  There is no contracti-
bility problem with respect to these assets.  But when the relevant asset 
is the intermediate good itself and this good is, by stipulation, non-
contractible, why is ownership of this good contractible? 
One response is that an ex ante contract can specify that anything 
created by RU—for concreteness, any patents received by RU—will be 
assigned to C.  But such a contract is not without cost.  It may well be 
30 These are ex post payoffs; to get the ex ante payoffs subtract E for C and e for RU.
31 Aghion and Tirole, supra note 2, at 1189. 
32 See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, ch. 2 (introducing and explaining the property 
rights approach to the firm). 
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the case that RU should retain ownership of some of its innovations.  
More importantly, if the innovation is truly noncontractible, a con-
tract that allocates RU ’s innovations to C can be circumvented.  If RU
learns that a certain innovation will be valuable, it can have the patent 
registered under a friend’s name, thus avoiding the obligation to as-
sign the patent to C.33
In practice, RU will be reluctant to have the patent registered in 
someone else’s name.  Either honesty or the desire to get credit for 
one’s innovation may be enough to avoid circumvention of the con-
tract.  Reputation can also help police the contract.  But these are 
empirical questions.  Aghion and Tirole’s theoretical framework relies 
on a specific answer to these empirical questions. 
D.  No Property Rights 
What happens when property rights in the innovation are not le-
gally recognized?  The basic question that Aghion and Tirole ask—
“Who should own the innovation?”—becomes meaningless.  This, in 
itself, shows the magnitude of the potential impact that the law may 
have on the boundaries-of-the-firm question.  The legal policy deci-
sion, whether to recognize property rights in the innovation, deter-
mines the contours of the economist’s inquiry. 
The law’s refusal to recognize property rights in the innovation 
does more than eliminate the who-should-own-the-innovation ques-
tion.  It redefines the organization-of-innovation question.  While 
ownership of the innovation can no longer distinguish between inte-
gration and nonintegration, other factors can step in and define the 
available organizational options. 
The property rights theory of the firm assumes that contracts are 
incomplete and that it is therefore important to allocate control rights 
to be exercised when the incomplete contract is silent.  Ownership is 
defined by residual control rights.34  Going back to control as the 
primitive variable in the property rights theory, is it possible to have 
control without legally recognized property rights?  The answer is yes.  
33 Cf. id. at 79 (arguing that while “the presence of a third party can help” contrac-
tibility problems, “there is a great incentive for” the third party to collude with another 
party); Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1193 (making an argument similar to ours 
about the irrelevance of the initial sharing rule). 
34 See HART, supra note 1, at 29-30 (defining residual-control rights as “the right to 
decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, 
or law”). 
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We explore two sources of control:  access to the innovation and con-
tractual restraints on employee mobility.35
1.  Access to the Innovation 
One source of control, independent of legally enforceable prop-
erty rights, derives from access to the innovation.  The choice between 
integration and nonintegration can affect this access to the innova-
tion.  In fact, absent property rights, we propose defining the organ-
izational form in terms of access.  Specifically, we define nonintegra-
tion as the case where RU has exclusive access to the innovation and 
can withhold knowledge of the innovation from C.  We define integra-
tion as the case where the existence and substance of the innovation 
are known by both RU and C.
Under integration, we posit, any innovation produced by RU is ac-
cessible to C.36  Still, since C does not have property rights in the inno-
vation, RU can disclose the innovation to C’s competitors.37 RU will 
use the threat of disclosure to extract higher wages. 
Consider the following simple model, which is a reduced-form 
version of the Anton and Yao model.38  The value of the innovation to 
C is V(e, E), assuming that C’s competitors do not have access to the 
innovation.  If RU discloses the innovation to C’s competitors, then C
will enjoy a reduced value of (1 – ) × V(e, E), where  [0, 1].  We as-
sume that in the bargaining between C and RU, C makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer with probability ½ and RU also makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer with probability ½.  Therefore, C’s expected payoff is ½ × V(e, E)
+ ½ ×  (1 – ) × V(e, E) or (1 – ½ × ) × V(e, E), and RU ’s expected 
payoff is ½ × × V(e, E).
Under nonintegration, RU can produce the innovation and keep 
it secret.  In other words, RU controls the access to the innovation and 
35 A clarification of terminology is in order.  Our purpose is to expound the role 
of law in drawing the boundaries of the firm.  We thus distinguish between legally rec-
ognized property rights and other sources of control.  We recognize, however, that 
economists may define “property right” more broadly to coincide with “control.”  But 
even under this definition it would be interesting to identify and compare different 
legal and extralegal sources of control. 
36 The alternative case, where an employee who made a discovery can try to nego-
tiate a wage increase while keeping the discovery secret, is in fact a nonintegration case 
under our access-based definition of integration and nonintegration. 
37 Alternatively, RU can leave the firm and use the innovation herself or start work-
ing for one of C’s competitors.  See infra subsection I.D.2. 
38 See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 192-95. 
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can withhold access from C.  But, because the innovation is only valu-
able in C’s hands, RU must bargain with C in order to extract any 
value from its investment.  And C will be reluctant to enter into such 
negotiations without knowing what RU has to sell.  The disclosure 
paradox, if applicable in its extreme form, prevents RU from reaping 
any benefits from its investment, which implies that RU will not invest.  
Similarly, anticipating this impediment to trade, C will not invest.  The 
result:  no innovation.39
But is this extreme no-trade, no-innovation result unavoidable?  
No.  Faced with the prospect of no innovation and a zero surplus, RU
is better off disclosing the innovation to C, free of charge.40  As sug-
gested by Anton and Yao, even after disclosing the innovation to C, RU
will still be able to extract some surplus from C by threatening to dis-
close the innovation to C’s competitors, as in the integration case.41
Under the nonintegration option, RU initially controls access to the 
innovation, but it will choose to relinquish control.  And since this loss 
of control is anticipated ex ante, the initial allocation of control to RU
is meaningless.  The parties’ incentives to invest will be determined 
only by the value of the innovation to C, by the cost to C of RU ’s mak-
ing good on its threat to disclose the innovation to others, and by the 
parties’ relative bargaining power.42
This result implies that organizational structure is irrelevant when 
property rights innovation can be organized only through access con-
39 Models applying the property rights theory, such as the A-T model, generally 
focus on ex ante efficiency and thus assume frictionless ex post bargaining under con-
ditions of symmetric information.  See HART, supra note 1, at 34, 38.  The secrecy 
forced by the absence of property rights renders this assumption inapplicable.  Bar-
gaining under asymmetric information suffers from well-known inefficiencies.  At the 
extreme, the market can completely unravel.  Anton and Yao formally show how ad-
verse selection leads to a “vanishingly small” payoff to the inventor when the inventor’s 
wealth is limited.  See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 203.  
(We follow Aghion and Tirole, supra note 2, at 1188, in assuming that RU has no initial 
cash endowment.)  But even if the extreme no-trade—and even no-negotiations—
outcome can be avoided, the parties will still expect a reduced ex post surplus and will 
accordingly be more reluctant to invest ex ante. 
40 See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 195 (noting that 
“an inventor who has made a difficult but valuable discovery can expect a significant 
payoff . . . by freely revealing the invention”). 
41 Id. at 195-96. 
42 RU ’s threat to disclose in the integration case is identical to RU ’s threat to dis-
close in the nonintegration case.  The resulting ex post wage adjustment affects the 
expected payoffs and investment incentives in the same way.  See generally Anton & Yao, 
Start-Ups, supra note 6 (examining the incentives faced by an employer and an em-
ployee after the employee privately discovers a significant innovation). 
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trol.  This result, while serving as a useful benchmark, is not the end 
of the story.  The economics literature has devised several mechanisms 
that would allow RU to secure a larger share of the ex post surplus if it 
is awarded exclusive access to the innovation.43  First, the disclosure 
paradox does not necessarily prevent trade.  There are cases where RU
will choose to negotiate with C before disclosing the innovation de-
spite the disclosure paradox—specifically when RU has significant ini-
tial wealth.44  Second, when RU can develop the innovation itself,45 C
can no longer assume that RU will disclose the innovation to it free of 
charge and access becomes a source of power affecting the outcome 
of the ex post bargaining between C and RU.46  Third, in some cases 
RU can disclose only part of the innovation to C and then bargain with 
43 Other ways in which RU may be able to extract some value from C, even absent 
property rights in the innovation, have been discussed in the literature but are not dis-
cussed in this paper.  See ARORA ET AL., supra note 2, at 116 (“[E]fficient contracts . . . can 
be written by exploiting the complementarity between know-how and any other technol-
ogy input that the licensor can use as a ‘hostage.’”); Teece, Profiting from Technological In-
novation, supra note 2, at 304 (discussing the importance of owning complementary assets 
for extracting value from the innovation); Lynne G. Zucker et al., Commercializing Knowl-
edge:  University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, in SCIENCE
AND CENTS: EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 149, 151 ( John V. Duca & 
Mine K. Yücel eds., 2002), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/ 
science/darby_zucker.pdf (detailing “the strong effects of academic science [in the form 
of academic-to-industry technology transfers] on the success of firms”); Bruno Biais & 
Enrico Perotti, Entrepreneurs and New Ideas 5 ( Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424601 (discussing how an “entrepreneur can take 
advantage of the complementarity between the different dimensions of her innovative 
idea, to mitigate the risk of idea stealing”).  Also, in certain contexts innovators are driven 
by nonpecuniary motives and are thus more willing to share ideas across firm boundaries.  
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 14 (2001) (arguing for the essential impor-
tance of free resources); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 374 (2002) (suggesting “characteristics that make large-scale col-
laborations . . . sustainable and productive in the digitally networked environment with-
out reliance either on markets or managerial hierarchy”).  Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, reputation—either of the research unit or of the customer—can overcome the 
disclosure paradox. 
44 See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 191 (arguing that 
an inventor is willing to negotiate when she has “large financial resources”). 
45 See Anton & Yao, Start-Ups, supra note 6, at 362 (discussing an employee’s op-
tion, upon making a discovery, to leave his firm and form a start-up); Gans & Stern, 
supra note 6, at 336 (discussing how “a start-up innovator . . . launch[es] its product 
independently”). 
46 Gans and Stern refer to this option as “[p]rofiting from innovation through the 
market for ideas” and discuss “negotiations . . . in the shadow of potential product market 
competition.”  Gans & Stern, supra note 6, at 336-37.  Seventy-one percent of the firms 
included in the Inc. 500 (a list of young, fast-growing firms) were founded by people who 
“replicated or modified an idea encountered through [their] previous employment.”  
AMAR V. BHIDÉ, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESSES 54 (2000). 
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C for a share of the surplus larger than what it could obtain after full 
disclosure.47  Finally, in some cases RU can leverage access and force C
to sign an NDA.48
In our benchmark irrelevance result A = 1 – ½ ×  regardless of 
the organizational form.  When access provides real power to RU un-
der nonintegration, NIntA  < 1 – ½ ×  = A.  We assume that 
NInt
A  > ½.  
Integration still implies IntA  = A = 1 – ½ × .
Lemma 1 summarizes the organization of innovation with and 
without property rights as a function of the relative marginal effi-
ciency of the parties’ investments. 
Lemma 1:  Three threshold values ( 1, 2, 3), satisfying 1 < 2
< 3, divide the parameter range  [0, ), as follows: 
(i)  When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment 
as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently low—i.e., 
1—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is pro-
tected by property rights and these rights are allocated to 
RU (nonintegration).  Absent property rights, inefficiency 
will be minimized by access-based nonintegration. 
(ii)  When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s invest-
ment as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently large—
i.e., 3—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is 
protected by property rights and these rights are allocated 
to C (integration).  Absent property rights, inefficiency will 
be minimized by access-based integration. 
(iii)  When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s invest-
ment as compared to RU’s investment is between these two 
extremes, efficiency is maximized by access-based organiza-
tion structure.  Specifically, access-based nonintegration 
maximizes efficiency when  ( 1, 2), and access-based in-
tegration maximizes efficiency when  [ 2, 3).
47 See Anton & Yao, supra note 13, at 514 (discussing the phenomenon of partial 
disclosure).
48 A legally enforceable NDA can be viewed as a substitute for property right pro-
tection—i.e., as an alternative mode of legal protection afforded to the innovation.  See
infra subsection I.D.2.  In essence, the viability of an NDA implies that the innovation is 
contractible.  Achieving contractibility is costly, perhaps prohibitively so.  RU would 
have to invest in detailed documentation of the innovation and C would have to invest 
in detailed documentation of its stock of knowledge in a way that would enable the 
execution of a nondisclosure agreement. 
1666 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1649
These results are depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
The following proposition states the role of the law in determin-
ing the organization of innovation and describes the welfare conse-
quences of a legal policy denying property rights in the innovation, 
when the alternative to property-based organization is access-based 
organization:
Proposition 1:  When, in the absence of property rights, the or-
ganization of innovation is access-based, the legal policy deny-
ing property rights in the innovation will replace property-
based organization with inefficient access-based organization 
when 1 and when 3.  When  ( 1, 3), this legal pol-
icy will have no effect, as long as the parties can effectively 
avoid property rights and opt for access-based organization. 
Part (iii) of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that access-based 
organization may be superior to property-based organization.  This 
does not imply any inefficiency in recognizing property rights in the 
innovation, as long as the parties can waive these rights in the ex ante 
contract—i.e., specify that neither party will obtain a property right 
(e.g., no patent application will be filed).  In some cases such a waiver 
may be impractical or even legally unenforceable.  In those cases, part 
(iii) of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 provide a reason not to recognize 
property rights in the innovation.49
49 Alternatively, if we allow for stochastic property rights, as does, for example, 
HART, supra note 1, at 86, then property rights again can only increase efficiency.  But 
stochastic property rights may also be legally unenforceable. 
0
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2.  Restraints on Employee Mobility 
Another source of control derives from contractual restrictions on 
employee mobility.  We have thus far assumed that the innovation can 
be readily disclosed to a competitor.  This assumption captures one 
set of cases.  In other cases, the innovation cannot be readily conveyed 
to a competitor.  Rather, RU must actually work for the competitor or 
physically relocate to the competitor’s plant and engage in hands-on 
training of the competitor’s employees.  This type of innovation is 
sometimes referred to as “know-how.” 
The know-how case introduces a new contractual possibility.  
Since the physical movement of employees is verifiable, such move-
ments can be contractually prevented.  Indeed firms routinely ask 
their employees to sign covenants not to compete, prohibiting the 
employees from working for a competitor for a prescribed period of 
time.  Oliver Hart observed that in technology-intensive industries, 
“[the firm’s] source of value may consist of as little as . . . a contract 
that prohibits [the firm’s] workers from working for competitors.”50
The property rights theory of the firm emphasizes control that 
stems from ownership of nonhuman assets.  This emphasis on non-
human assets is motivated by “the absence of slavery.”51  But as de-
scribed above—and as recognized by Hart—contractual restrictions 
on employee mobility do exist and can be an important source of con-
trol.52  Of course, the reach of these contractual restrictions and, cor-
respondingly, the extent of control that they provide are not unlim-
ited.  And it is the law that sets the limits—limits that echo the slavery 
concerns raised by Hart.53
50 Id. at 57.  Aghion and Tirole discuss trailer clauses, which are closely related to 
CNCs, yet they retain the assumption that property rights in the innovation are legally 
recognized.  Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1199-1200. 
51 HART, supra note 1, at 29. 
52 Cf. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, Knowledge Disclosure, Patents, and Op-
timal Organization of Research and Development 4 (London Sch. of Econ., Suntory & Toy-
ota Int’l Ctrs. for Econ. & Related Disciplines, Research Paper No. TE/2004/478, 
2004), available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/te/te478.pdf (describing a situation in 
which a developing unit’s control over a research unit derives from an ex ante contract 
providing the developing unit with a right to veto the research unit’s outside financing 
choices). 
53 A CNC is not a property right according to Hart’s basic definition.  He defines 
property rights as residual-control rights—“the right to decide all usages of the asset.”  
HART, supra note 1, at 30.  Hart correctly notes that this definition is “consistent with 
the standard view of ownership [and property rights] adopted by lawyers.”  Id. at 30 
n.4.  Nevertheless, Hart notes that a CNC may be the defining asset of R&D firms. 
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A first-cut analysis maps CNCs to organizational structure as fol-
lows:  integration obtains when C hires RU and secures control by hav-
ing RU sign a CNC.  Conversely, nonintegration obtains when RU does 
not sign a CNC and remains free to relocate to another firm.  But this 
binary characterization is an oversimplification. 
A CNC, in terms of the control that it affords to the customer, is a 
continuous variable.54  CNCs can vary on several continuous dimen-
sions—specifically, the size of the geographic area in which the em-
ployee cannot seek alternative employment and the time period in 
which the employee is prevented from competing with the customer.  
In the basic property rights theory of the firm,55 allocation of control is 
discrete:  a certain nonhuman asset is allocated either to one firm or 
to another.  Continuous allocation of control, as obtained through 
CNCs, is less conducive to clear demarcation of firm boundaries.56
Still, as Hart recognizes, a CNC can be the central asset defining a 
technology-intensive firm, especially when the innovation is not af-
forded property right protection. 
Extending the framework described in Section I.A, let V(e, E) de-
note the value of the innovation to C, if C’s competitors do not have 
access to the innovation.  If RU leaves C and starts working for C’s 
competitor with her knowledge of the innovation, the value of the in-
novation to C is (1 – ) × V(e, E), where  [0,1].  C can limit RU ’s
ability to disclose the innovation by enjoining the employee from 
working for C’s competitors.  We capture this power through a pa-
rameter,  [0, 1], that measures the strength of the CNC.  With a 
CNC, the value of the innovation to C is (1 – (1 – ) × ) × V(e, E).  At 
one extreme,  = 0, the CNC is powerless, and C loses the entire pro-
portion  if RU relocates to C’s competitor:  (1 – (1 – ) × ) × V(e, E) = 
(1 – ) × V(e, E).  At the other extreme,  = 1, the CNC is sufficiently 
strong in terms of its geographic or temporal reach that C loses noth-
ing from RU ’s relocation to a firm outside the geographical boundary 
54 Imperfect enforcement transforms the allocation of property rights from a dis-
crete to a continuous decision.  See, e.g., Arora & Merges, supra note 20, at 452-53 (dis-
cussing the effects of information spillovers on firms based on different levels of rights 
protection); Rajan & Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy, supra note 7, at 826-28 
(discussing the effects of better or worse enforcement on the nature of a firm).  But, 
unlike with CNCs, the continuous variable is not in the parties’ control (at least not 
entirely; the parties can affect the probability of enforcement to some degree). 
55 See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, ch. 2 (presenting the property rights model and 
discussing how the theory influences organizational arrangements). 
56 Imperfect enforcement of property rights can similarly transform a discrete al-
location of property rights into a continuous allocation. 
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of the CNC or after the term of the CNC expires:  (1 – (1 – ) × ) ×
V(e, E) = V(e, E).
C’s expected payoff is (1 – ½ × (1 – ) × ) × V(e, E).  RU ’s ex-
pected payoff is ½ × (1 – ) × × V(e, E).  When the source of control 
is a CNC, we have CNC = 1 – ½ × (1 – ) × .
The parties’ incentives to invest depend on the strength of the 
CNC—i.e., on .  At one extreme, when  = 0, RU ’s incentives are 
strongest, but still weaker than her incentives under nonintegration in 
the A-T model where the innovation is protected by property rights.  
C’s incentives are weakest when  = 0, but they are still stronger than 
the incentives generated under nonintegration in the A-T model:   
CNC |  = 0  = 1 – ½ ×  > ½ = 
NInt
P .  At the other extreme, when  = 1, 
RU ’s incentives are weakest and C’s incentives are strongest.  A  = 1 
CNC precisely mimics the outcome obtained under integration in the 
A-T model.  A very powerful CNC provides as much control as a prop-
erty right: CNC |  = 1  = 1 = 
Int
P .
Enter the law.  The law imposes an upper bound,  (0, 1), on 
the strength of the CNC.  A CNC with  >  will not be enforced.  
When the marginal efficiency of C’s investment relative to that of RU’s
investment is sufficiently small, the legal constraint is not binding.  
But when the marginal efficiency of C’s investment is large enough 
relative to that of RU’s investment, the organizational structure as 
characterized by the strength of the CNC will be determined by the 
legal constraint , rather than by the incentive considerations high-
lighted by the economic theory of the firm. 
These results are summarized in Lemma 2, which describes the 
organization of innovation with and without property rights as a func-
tion of the relative marginal efficiency of the parties’ investments. 
Lemma 2:  Two threshold values ( 1, 2), satisfying 1 < 2, di-
vide the parameter range  [0, ), as follows: 
(i)  When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment 
as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently low—i.e., 
1—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is pro-
tected by property rights and these rights are allocated to 
RU (nonintegration).  Absent property rights, inefficiency 
will be minimized by a  = 0 CNC—i.e., the parties will not 
sign a CNC. 
(ii)  When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s invest-
ment as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently large—
i.e., 2—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is 
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protected by property rights and these rights are allocated 
to C (integration).  Absent property rights, inefficiency will 
be minimized by a  =  CNC—i.e., the parties will sign the 
strongest enforceable CNC. 
(iii)  When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s invest-
ment as compared to RU’s investment is between these ex-
tremes—i.e.,  ( 1, 2)—efficiency is maximized by an op-
timally designed CNC with  (0, ].
These results are depicted in Figure 2.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
law’s dual role in shaping the organization of innovation.  First, the 
law determines whether property-based organization is possible.  Sec-
ond, the law determines the limits of CNC-based organization by im-
posing an upper bound on the strength of a CNC. 
Figure 2 
The following proposition states the role of the law in determin-
ing the organization of innovation and describes the welfare conse-
quences of a legal policy denying property rights in the innovation, 
when the alternative to property-based organization is CNC-based  
organization.
Proposition 2:  When, in the absence of property rights, the or-
ganization of innovation is CNC based, 
(i)  The legal policy denying property rights in the innova-
tion will replace property-based organization with ineffi-
cient CNC-based organization when 1 and when 2.
When  ( 1, 2), this legal policy will have no effect if par-
ties can waive property rights and will increase efficiency 
otherwise.
0
0
Int
P = CNC ( =1)NIntP
11 – ½½
1 2
CNC( = )CNC ( =0)
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(ii)  A legal policy imposing stricter limits on enforceable 
CNCs—i.e., a lower —reduces 2 and thus increases the 
inefficiency caused by the absence of property rights in the 
broader 2 range and leads to a narrower  ( 1, 2)
range where CNC-based organization is superior to prop-
erty-based organization. 
Part (iii) of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 imply that CNC-based or-
ganization may be superior to property-based organization.57  This 
does not imply any inefficiency in recognizing property rights in the 
innovation, as long as the parties can waive these rights in the ex ante 
contract—i.e., as long as parties can specify that neither party will ob-
tain a property right and sign a CNC instead.  In some cases such a 
waiver may be impractical or even legally unenforceable.  In those 
cases, part (iii) of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 provide a reason not to 
recognize property rights in the innovation.58
II. THE LAW
A.  Property or No Property 
We have argued that the organization of innovation depends on 
whether the innovation is legally protected.  It is therefore important 
to understand the details of the legal framework that determines 
when innovation is afforded legal protection.  We begin with patent 
law, which affords property right protection to a certain class of inno-
vations.  We then proceed to survey other sources of legal protection.  
Under these alternative sources, innovation can be protected at a level 
below property right protection.  Even this lesser protection may be 
57 The parties cannot improve the outcome obtained under property-based or-
ganization by adding CNCs.  CNCs are meaningless when the innovation is protected 
by property rights.  First consider the integration case, where the property right is allo-
cated to C.  CNCs are meaningless in this case, since the allocation of property rights 
already provides C with maximal control.  Next, consider the nonintegration case, 
where the property right is allocated to the employee.  Without a CNC, C ’s expected 
payoff is ½ × V(e, E) – E and the employee’s expected payoff is ½ × V(e, E) – e.  The 
same payoffs are obtained with a CNC.  When C makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer, the 
CNC is irrelevant.  And when the employee makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer she will 
wield the superior power of the property right, again rendering the CNC meaningless. 
58 Alternatively, if we allow for stochastic property rights, then property rights 
again can only increase efficiency; stochastic property rights, however, may also be le-
gally unenforceable.  See supra note 49. 
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sufficient to allow standard organization of innovation, or what we 
have been referring to as property-based organization of innovation. 
1.  Patent Law 
Patent law is the main legal field that governs innovation.  Patent 
law creates and protects property rights in innovative products, meth-
ods of operation, and processes.  A patent grants patentees protection 
for twenty years from the date on which the application is filed.59  Over 
time, patent protection has expanded in scope to cover new subject 
matters and in some cases even embryonic inventions.  Recently, how-
ever, we have witnessed some scaling back of the scope of patent pro-
tection and the ease with which it can be obtained. 
Protection under the Patent Act is not available to ideas per se.  
The patent system is designed to reward inventors who transform the 
idea underlying an invention into “something of utility.”60  To receive 
a patent, an application must meet substantive and procedural re-
quirements specified in the statutory scheme.61  Specifically, it must 
describe an invention that is useful, novel, and nonobvious to a per-
son skilled in the relevant art.62  Our patent law affords protection 
only to manmade innovation, and not to natural or scientific facts.  In 
this spirit, courts have been wary of extending the scope of patents to 
naturally occurring phenomena and basic scientific relationships.63
Until recently, patent protection enjoyed a period of strengthen-
ing and expansion, notwithstanding a significant scholarly opposition 
to this trend.64  This trend manifested itself in various aspects of patent 
59 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
60 See Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind:  An “Idea” 
Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 705, 716-17 (2006) (describing how ideas can-
not per se receive protection since “[p]atents protect inventions, and inventions are a 
discrete subset of ideas that have satisfied threshold . . . requirements”). 
61 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376. 
62 See id. §§ 101–103 (setting forth these general requirements). 
63 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) 
(holding that the patent sought was for a natural phenomenon and thus that the in-
vention was not patentable); see also Michael Meehan, The Handiwork of Nature:  Pat-
entable Subject Matter and Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite Labs, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 311, 312 (2006) (“Although the wording of the statute is broad, it is nonetheless 
well established that mathematical algorithms, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas cannot be patented.”). 
64 See, e.g., Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong 
Patent Protection:  A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 281 (1998) (ar-
guing that stronger patent protection may hinder rather than stimulate technological 
and economic process).  Mazzoleni and Nelson also provide additional references 
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law, including the broadening of the definition of patentable subject 
matter to include, among others, business-method patents,65 the en-
couraging of government-subsidized bodies (such as universities) to 
claim patent protection,66 and the increasing tendency of the legal sys-
tem to uphold patents.67  As part of this trend, patent law has ex-
panded to tolerate even merely embryonic innovation.68  In In re Stra-
hilevitz, for example, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—the 
precursor to the Federal Circuit—stated that an invention did not 
have to be built or tested to receive a patent, nor did there have to be 
a working model.69
Patent law provides an impressive array of remedies to successful 
plaintiffs, including injunctive relief, actual damages, treble damages 
for willful infringement, and attorneys’ fees in exceptional cases.70
Recently, we have witnessed a certain retraction from the expan-
sive trend that swept through the patent world.  In a series of deci-
sions, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit raised the pat-
entability bar and narrowed the scope of protection.  In 2007, in 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a li-
censee can seek a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid without 
first terminating or giving up the license.71  This part of the ruling 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s rule that the existence of a license 
supporting this academic trend opposing the expansion of patent protection.  See id. at 
282-84. 
65 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the broad statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to 
find a business method patentable), abrogated on other grounds by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
66 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 614-15 (2008) (noting and discussing the rise of university  
patenting).
67 This tendency is mainly due to the establishment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.  See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 64, at 274 
(“From 1982 through 1987, 89% of the district court decisions of patent validity have 
been upheld by the [Federal Circuit], up from 30% prior to [its] creation . . . .”). 
68 See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 
445 (2004) (“Policies that permit patenting of embryonic research results—that is, that 
allow patenting prior to the bulk of the investment needed to bring the innovation to 
market—increase the efficiency of the competition . . . .”). 
69 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“We recognize that working examples are 
desirable in complex technologies . . . [but] examples are not required . . . .”). 
70 See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1477, 1511-13 (2005) (comparing the potential remedies available under patent 
law with those available under contract law). 
71 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007). 
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agreement categorically eliminated “apprehension of suit” by the li-
censee.72  Furthermore, in a footnote, the Supreme Court called into 
question the entirety of the Federal Circuit’s declaratory-judgment  
jurisprudence.73
In another 2007 decision, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid con-
struction of the “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test employed to 
determine the obviousness of new inventions.74  The Court empha-
sized the need for a flexible, common-sense approach to obviousness 
that takes account of motivations implicit in the prior art.75  An impor-
tant implication of the Court’s ruling is that it will make it harder to 
secure—and easier to invalidate—patents.
The Federal Circuit, for its part, issued two important decisions 
concerning patentable subject matter.  First, in 2007, the Federal Cir-
cuit decided in In re Nuijten that a signal cannot be patented since it is 
not a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.76
Second, in October 2008, the Federal Circuit’s nine-to-three en banc
decision in In re Bilski refused to accord protection to a process of 
hedging risks in commodity trading, stating that to be patentable a 
process must be connected to a machine or apparatus or must “trans-
form[] a particular article into a different state or thing.”77  This deci-
sion limits the applicability of patent protection to certain business 
methods and processes and may portend a more restrictive construc-
tion of patentable subject matter more generally. 
Finally, in In re Ferguson,78 the Federal Circuit held that a method 
for marketing software and other products via shared marketing force 
cannot be patented as it does not constitute a patentable subject mat-
ter.  The court reaffirmed its holding in In re Bilski, stating that “the 
Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test is the ‘definitive test 
to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to 
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle 
72 See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
73 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.11 (“The [Federal Circuit’s] reasonable-
apprehension-of-suit test . . . conflicts with our decisions . . . .”). 
74 See 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) (finding the Federal Circuit’s test too narrow 
and inconsistent with precedent). 
75 Id.
76 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 172 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2008). 
77 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-
0964, 2009 WL 221232 ( June 1, 2009). 
78 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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rather than to pre-empt the principle itself.’”79  The court, then, ex-
plained that since the applicant’s method is neither tied to any machine 
or apparatus, nor transforms an article into a different shape or thing, 
it fails to “meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”80
2.  Trade Secret Law 
Trade secret law originated from the fields of torts, contracts, and 
equitable claims, rather than property.81  To date, it remains contro-
versial whether trade secrets enjoy property status.  Traditionally, 
courts did not treat trade secrets as property rights.  Yet in the last few 
decades, the courts have reversed course.82  The change was motivated 
in part by the property-like characteristics of trade secrets (such as as-
signability) and in part by the courts’ desire to strengthen incentives 
to innovate.83  Nevertheless, several commentators disagree with the 
new approach and argue that trade secrets constitute at best quasi 
property or incomplete property rights.84
Indeed, trade secrets lack some of the defining characteristics of 
property rights.  Trade secrets do not bestow upon their holder an in 
rem right (that is, a right that avails against the rest of the world); 
rather, trade secrets arise in the bilateral context of confidentiality du-
79 Id. at 1363 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
80 Id.
81 See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (2004) 
(describing the “complex pedigree” of trade secrecy). 
82 Compare E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 
(1917) (“[T]he starting point for the present matter is not property . . . [but the de-
fendant’s] confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . .”), and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 cmt. a (1939) (“[T]he protection is afforded only by a general duty of good 
faith . . . .”), with Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Trade se-
crets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property.”), and Ke-
wanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-85 (1974) (“[T]he encouragement of 
invention [is] the broadly stated polic[y] behind trade secret law.”). 
83 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL AGE 38 (4th ed. 2006) (“Treatment of trade secrets as property rights . . . is 
consistent with a view of trade secrets law as providing an additional incentive to inno-
vate . . . .”); see also Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property:  Do Ruckelshaus and Car-
penter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 
366 (1989) (discussing how “two recent . . . decisions classified information as private 
property”). 
84 See, e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 603 (“[T]rade secrets . . . lacking 
the right to exclude, cannot properly be considered property rights at all.”); Burk, su-
pra note 81, at 11 (“[T]rade secrecy does not confer a property right, or at best it con-
fers an incomplete property right.”). 
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ties.  Furthermore, trade secrets do not confer exclusivity upon their 
holder; a trade secret may be held by multiple holders at the same time. 
Despite their weak proprietary status, the protection afforded to 
trade secrets is broad and strong, and if misappropriation of a trade 
secret can be proven, a variety of remedies becomes available to the 
holder, including injunctive relief and damages.  The Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, which has been adopted generally by the majority of ju-
risdictions,85 defines trade secrets broadly to encompass any 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
86
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade 
secret broadly as well.  Under the Restatement, the term includes “any 
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other 
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an ac-
tual or potential economic advantage over others.”87
The broad definition of trade secrets implies that various types of 
commercially valuable information and business concepts that cannot 
be patented can easily be protected as trade secrets.  It is clear, for ex-
ample, that inchoate inventions, consumer lists, minimally innovative 
processes and methods, and “negative information”—that is, informa-
tion about failed experiments, products, and methods—all come 
within the definition of trade secrets so long as they accrue economic 
value to the owner.  Yet not all valuable information can be claimed 
under trade secret law.  In order to be protected, information must be 
confidential and its holder must adopt reasonable measures to ensure 
its secrecy.  Information that is either generally known or ascertain-
able to the market cannot be claimed as a trade secret. 
85 It has been adopted by forty states, while the rest continue to apply the common 
law or separate state statutes.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 
statutory note at 437-38 (1995). 
86 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-38 (2005). 
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).  The Restatement 
also expands the remedies provided in the course of trade secrets protection.  See id.
§§ 44–45 (providing for injunctive and monetary relief). 
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In addition, a trade secret does not confer exclusivity in the subject 
matter of the secret, as the law does not protect against reverse engi-
neering or independent discovery of the trade secret.88  The inventor 
remains vulnerable to such measures and may absorb a resulting de-
crease in the attractiveness of the information to prospective assignees. 
On first impression, it also seems that trade secrecy constitutes a 
very strong form of protection.  But this impression is incorrect; the 
protection is less effective than it first appears.89  The main practical 
shortcoming of trade secret law is that it is difficult to prevail in an ac-
tion for misappropriation of trade secrets.90
First, as noted above, trade secret protection is limited to the con-
text of confidentiality duties, such as employment relationships or 
business partnerships.  As a result, trade secret disputes typically arise 
in cases where a former employee or business partner is purported to 
have used confidential information or in the aftermath of failed nego-
tiations.91  In fact, concern for former employers’ interests was among 
the main reasons for recognizing trade secret protection.92
Second, it is usually difficult to substantiate a misappropriation 
claim in court.  Proving misappropriation of trade secrets requires a 
showing that the information could not be obtained from any other 
source.93  In clear cases, of course, trade secret protection does have 
bite.  Such cases may involve theft or industrial espionage by a com-
petitor or appropriation of physical documents by former employees.94
Yet most cases involve considerable cost and uncertainty, a fact that 
88 Burk & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 600 (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 
cmt., 14 U.L.A 538). 
89 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:  
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600 (1999) 
(“[I]t remains the case that [trade secret] protection is limited . . . .”). 
90 See Anton & Yao, Start-Ups, supra note 6, at 363 (“In practice, detection is prob-
lematic and court challenges . . . are difficult to win.”); Gilson, supra note 89, at 598-
600 (discussing barriers to legal victories in trade secret litigation). 
91 See, e.g., Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (arising from a manufacturer’s alleged breach of an NDA between it and an in-
ventor); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 468 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Minn. 
1979) (arising from a failed business relationship). 
92 See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 83, at 80-82 (discussing issues relating to 
departing employees and their former employers).
93 Merges, supra note 70, at 28-29 (illustrating the difficulty of proving misappro-
priation under On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, 386 F.3d 
1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
94 See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley High Velocity Labor Market, 11 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Summer 1998, at 27, 31-32 (describing an investigation of suspected corporate 
theft by a former employee of Intel). 
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weighs against bringing a lawsuit in the first place.  Furthermore, in 
certain industrial environments, such as Silicon Valley, where the cul-
ture supports free movement of employees, firms that sue for misap-
propriation of trade secrets may incur reputational penalties.95
The secrecy requirement of trade secret protection thus detracts 
from the practical value of this form of legal protection by making it 
difficult to sell and license trade secrets to third parties.  This problem 
is especially acute when the protected information needs to be dis-
closed in the precontractual stage of business negotiations.  There are, 
of course, legal mechanisms designed to address this problem.  Chief 
among those are NDAs that oblige the disclosee to refrain from dis-
closing confidential information.  Powerful parties, however, often re-
fuse to sign NDAs and instead demand that the disclosing party sign a 
legal document that releases the powerful party from all liability if the 
information is somehow disclosed.  Even when an NDA is signed, its 
enforcement involves major evidentiary problems, owing in part to the 
complexity of defining the information and separating it from preex-
isting knowledge.96
In addition to the disincentive to enter negotiations faced by the 
disclosing party, the disclosee is disincentivized by the fewer rights 
that she receives.  As discussed above, the disclosee cannot be guaran-
teed exclusivity (because of, for example, independent development 
or reverse engineering by a third party).97  More generally, they can-
not be provided with true residual control, and any contractual at-
tempt to include it will be both incomplete and expensive, sometimes 
prohibitively so.98  Patent protection makes it much easier to transfer 
the protected information relative to trade secret protection. 
95 See Gilson, supra note 89, at 601 (discussing how firms “risk[] the imposition of 
labor market-imposed reputation penalties”); Hyde, supra note 94, at 32 (noting that 
“Intel acquired a reputation for being a bully towards its own employees, and may have 
paid for it” as potential employees “constantly asked . . . if they too would be sued if . . . 
they would someday leave the company”). 
96 Arora & Merges, supra note 20, at 461.
97 See supra text accompanying note 88. 
98 See Merges, supra note 70, at 7-9 (discussing costs associated with contractual 
protections). 
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3.  Copyright Law 
Although copyright protection does not extend to “any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery,”99 it has a role in encouraging and protecting innovation. 
A substantial advantage of the copyright regime is that protection 
attaches at the moment that the work is “fixed in any tangible me-
dium.”100  This attachment mechanism is unlike that of patent and 
trade secret law, which are dependent upon time- (and money-) con-
suming processes, such as filing applications or negotiating contracts. 
The copyright regime entitles a copyright owner only to the rights 
that are explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, and only for a lim-
ited time,101 as opposed to the full residual right associated with a 
property right.  With regard to these rights, the copyright regime car-
ries property-like characteristics such as exclusivity102 and injunctive 
remedies.103  These characteristics, however, exist alongside consider-
able nonproperty features that limit their reach, such as compulsory-
licensing schemes104 and exemptions like the fair use doctrine (which 
essentially constitutes a compulsory license at zero royalties).105  Con-
sequently, copyright protection is less strong than the protection pro-
vided by the patent regime, which is largely free of broad exemptions 
and exceptions. 
Moreover, the routes for permissible appropriation of a trade se-
cret are available in copyright law as well.  Like trade secret law, copy-
right law does not protect the creator from independent creation of 
99 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas.”). 
100 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
101 See id. §§ 106, 302 (enumerating rights of copyright holders and their dura-
tion).  In fact, however, commentators point towards an expansion of the copyright 
regime, stretching to an all-purpose, general-use right with no effective time limitation.  
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175, 
183 (“[W]e need to remember that copyright was never intended to be a general-use 
right.  Rather, Congress designed the statutory copyright as a collection of enumer-
ated, individually bounded, exclusive rights.”). 
102 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating the “exclusive rights” of the copyright 
owner). 
103 See id. § 502(a) (authorizing injunctive remedies). 
104 Compulsory licenses are area specific.  See, e.g., id. § 114(d)(2) (providing 
compulsory licenses for digital transmissions of sound recordings); id. § 115 (providing 
compulsory licenses for “cover” music). 
105 See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 158-60 (2000) (discussing 
how fair use may be considered a compulsory-licensing scheme). 
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an identical work.106  Similarly, in the area of computer software, a 
copyrighted work is vulnerable to reverse engineering.107  Indeed, 
courts have established the lawfulness of intermediate copying and 
decompilation of computer software when it is intended to extract 
public domain elements and develop interoperable or competing 
products.108
In addition, copyright law occupies an intermediate position be-
tween the disclosure regimes of patents and trade secrecy.  On the 
one hand, copyright protection is not conditioned upon publication, 
as patent protection is rare, but on the other hand, it does require 
fixation in a tangible medium of expression.  Moreover, publication 
may prove to be rewarding in the evidentiary structure of copyrights 
because it creates a presumption that a later similar work was copied 
rather than independently created.109
Copyright law incorporates the “work made for hire” doctrine, 
which vests in employers copyrights in original works made by their 
employees.110  While this doctrine increases certainty to some degree, 
its boundaries are blurry because of the practical difficulty that some-
106 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 
1936) (“[B]ut if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew 
Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author’ . . . .”). 
107 Reverse engineering constitutes infringement in other areas of copyright law 
when it involves so-called “intermediate copying.”  See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Acco-
lade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that intermediate copying 
of computer code is infringement, but finding it protected fair use in this case); 
Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding intermediate 
copying of blueprints to be infringement); Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 
F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that intermediate copying of story boards 
and scripts was infringement). 
108 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-03 
(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that where copying is necessary to access functional ele-
ments, it constitutes fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 
832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding Atari’s noncommercial reverse engineering to be 
fair use); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse En-
gineering and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 993 (1994) (suggesting that the 
object-code exception to copyright exists to limit copyright’s strength and breadth); 
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies:  The United States Experience in a 
Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 143-44 (1989) (“[B]y encouraging third 
parties to make free and abundant use of nonprotectable matter underlying the pro-
tected expression, copyright laws foster a built-in process of ‘reverse engineering’ that 
enables many copyrightable works to cluster around common themes or ideas.”). 
109 See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (noting that the widespread dissemination of the allegedly copied work 
could support a finding of access to it); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evi-
dence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003). 
110 See 17 U.S.C § 101 (2006) (defining, among other things, “work made for hire”). 
2009] Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms 1681
times arises in discerning the distinction between employees and  
contractors.111
Copyright law affords rights holders a wide array of remedies, in-
cluding injunctions, actual and statutory damages, disgorgement of an 
infringer’s profits, and impoundment and destruction of infringing 
articles.112
In sum, then, it can be said that copyright law encourages disclo-
sure of commercially valuable information, but not nearly as much as 
patent law does.  Relative to trade secrecy, copyright protection al-
lows greater employee mobility and permits interfirm transactions, 
and it avoids the problems associated with these goals in the trade se-
cret regime resulting from the undisclosed nature of the information 
in that area.113
4.  The Law of Ideas 
It is important to note at the outset that there is no federal body 
of law specifically designed to provide direct legal protection to ideas.  
Thus, state law will be the focal point of this discussion.114  As far as 
state law is concerned, protection for ideas was historically left to the 
courts and was developed by a process of accretion.  A review of the 
case law reveals that courts have applied various common law doc-
trines on an ad hoc basis to afford protection to ideas in certain situa-
tions.  These efforts resulted in a largely inconsistent and incoherent 
body of law.115
111 See Barak Y. Orbach, The Law and Economics of Hired Creativity:  Who Should 
Own the Rights? 46-47 (Oct. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/workshops/Documents/Fall20
03/orbach.pdf (“[M]uch of the discussion . . . under copyright law . . . is focused on 
the evasive . . . distinction between employees and independent contractors.”). 
112 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505, 509. 
113 See Burk, supra note 81, at 9 (“Resolving trade secrecy disputes is especially 
problematic in the case of employee departure, as courts are reluctant to curtail the mo-
bility of labor.”); see also Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302-07 (1996) (discuss-
ing intellectual property regimes from both liability-rule and property-rule perspectives). 
114 See generally Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956) (en banc) (using 
implied contracts to protect ideas from disclosure and misappropriation); Bristol v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 30 N.E. 506, 507 (N.Y. 1892) (applying New York law 
of ideas); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459-60 (1868) (“In this court, it is settled 
that a secret art is a legal subject of property . . . .”). 
115 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 60, at 731 (noting that these common law doctrines 
resemble federal patent and copyright requirements but concluding that “their appli-
cation in idea law is misguided”). 
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The starting point for these judicial efforts has usually been that 
ideas do not deserve property protection.116  Therefore, plaintiffs were 
forced to rely on other doctrines, such as contracts, quasi-contracts, 
confidential relationships, and unjust enrichment to prove their 
claims.117  Typically, they did not prevail.118  The courts’ reluctance to 
protect pure ideas was driven both by a desire to prevent the monopo-
lization of ideas and by a concern about the evidentiary and adminis-
trative difficulties associated with such protection.119
Although state laws concerning protection of ideas are ambiguous 
and therefore difficult to classify and analyze, it is possible to discern 
two threshold parameters that ideas must satisfy to win protection.120
The first is concreteness:  to be protected, an idea must be concrete 
and not merely abstract.121  The second is its novelty, sometimes ad-
dressed as “originality,”122 meaning that the idea is beyond the general 
knowledge in the field.123
The requirement of concreteness is vague, and it varies among ju-
risdictions.  Some courts have required ideas to be both reduced to a 
116 See id. (noting judicial reluctance to allow compensation for misappropriation of 
ideas); see also Larissa Katz, A Powers-Based Approach to the Protection of Ideas, 23 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 706 (2006) (“We cannot look to property theory to uncover the 
source of the duty not to use or disclose another’s idea shared in confidence for the sim-
ple reason that idea-submission law concerns a more limited or in personam rights-duty 
relationship than the in rem rights-duty relationship that property law describes.”). 
117 See Katz, supra note 116, at 706-15 (detailing the various approaches); Miller, 
supra note 60, at 764-73 (same). 
118 See Miller, supra note 60, at 731. 
119 See id. at 720 (discussing these “two core concerns underlying the courts’ reluc-
tance to recognize a protectable interest in ideas”). 
120 But see Katz, supra note 116, at 692 (noting four prerequisites:  novelty, original-
ity, confidentiality, and concreteness).  This different classification is largely semantic, 
but it does demonstrate the courts’ inconsistency. 
121 See, e.g., Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (App. Div. 
1940) (“[O]wing to the difficulties of enforcing such rights, the courts have uniformly 
refused to assume to protect property in ideas that have not been reduced to a con-
crete form.”); Williamson v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 16 N.Y.S.2d 217, 217-18 (App. Div. 
1939) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff’s idea never took on concrete form at the time of disclo-
sure so as to give rise to a property right . . . .”); Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 23 
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (“Only where the idea has been reduced to concrete 
form prior to its disclosure to and appropriation by the defendant may recovery be had 
upon an implied contract.”). 
122 Miller, supra note 60, at 726. 
123 For a view that criticizes these standards and offers an alternative framework, 
see id. at 731-32. 
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tangible form and highly detailed and developed,124 while others have 
only adhered to the first requirement of tangibility.125  Courts’ inter-
pretations of the novelty requirement also vary across jurisdictions.126
Most jurisdictions strictly require that an idea be absolutely and objec-
tively novel—meaning unknown in the field in general—in order to 
receive protection.  New York, in contrast, is more flexible.  The 
courts in New York require that the idea be novel only to the recipient 
when a confidentiality or nondisclosure contract is signed between the 
parties prior to disclosure.127  Moreover, postdisclosure agreements are 
enforceable in New York regardless of the novelty of the idea.128  In 
the absence of a formal contract between the parties, however, when 
the misappropriation claim is predicated on theories of quasi-contract 
or breach of a confidential relationship, the New York courts reintro-
duced the strict novelty standard, requiring the plaintiff to prove that 
her idea is novel in absolute and objective terms.129  The novelty stan-
124 See, e.g., Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 665 (Nev. 1975) (“An idea in or-
der to meet the test of concreteness must be ready for immediate use without any addi-
tional embellishment.”). 
125 See, e.g., Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 258 A.2d 153, 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1969) (“The concept submitted by [plaintiff] is not an abstract one in the sense that it 
is incapable of physical form.  Rudimentary as it is, the idea can be transformed into a 
product.  It is, to that extent, concrete and usable.”), aff ’d, 275 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1971).  Professor Miller criticizes requiring tangibility as anachronistic, 
especially in light of the development of intangible injuries, assets, and concepts in 
other fields of the law.  See Miller, supra note 60, at 724. 
126 See Katz, supra note 116, at 693 (noting that across jurisdictions, there is a lack 
of clarity on how to assess and distinguish novelty criteria); Mary LaFrance, Something 
Borrowed, Something New:  The Changing Role of Novelty in Idea Protection Law, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 485, 485-86 (2004) (noting that “[i]dea protection doctrine . . . differs 
primarily in the role played by the concept of ‘novelty’” and noting that “[t]here is no 
one authoritative definition of novelty in this context”). 
127 See LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (discussing New York’s novelty require-
ments).
128 See Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (N.Y. 1993) 
(“The law of contracts would have to be substantially rewritten were we to allow buyers 
of fully disclosed ideas to disregard their obligation to pay simply because an idea 
could have been obtained from some other source or in some other way.”); see also La-
France, supra note 126, at 486 (“New York requires some form of novelty as a prerequi-
site to all forms of idea protection other than post-disclosure contracts.”). 
129 See Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“[M]isappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in ab-
solute terms.  This is so because unoriginal, known ideas have no value as property and 
the law does not protect against the use of that which is free and available to all.”); see
also LaFrance, supra note 126, at 492-95 (summarizing the Nadel decision and its  
implications). 
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dard with respect to suits based on a theory of unjust enrichment re-
mains unclear in New York and is subject to scholarly debate.130
California law takes a more liberal approach to the novelty re-
quirement in cases of predisclosure agreements,131 an approach that 
has been followed by other states.132  In California, the question of 
novelty has taken on an evidentiary nature; it is treated as evidence of 
contractual consideration rather than as a necessary element. 
The New Jersey courts are quite vague on the subject, and the case 
law does not provide clear guidance on the novelty requirement.133
Professor Miller has argued that the application of the concrete-
ness and novelty parameters bars protection to the vast majority of 
ideas.134  Thus, according to Miller, as far as the legal protection of 
ideas is concerned, current state protection does not represent a ma-
jor improvement over the nonexistent federal protection.135
130 Compare LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (“For an idea to be protected under 
unjust enrichment/quasi-contract, however, the idea must be novel in the general or 
absolute sense—in other words, unknown not only to the buyer but also to the public 
in general.”), with Katz, supra note 116, at 695-96 (“For unjust enrichment claims in 
New York and California, a plaintiff need only establish that the idea was novel to the 
defendant, rather than generally or objectively novel.”). 
131 See Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1966) (“An idea which can be the subject matter of a contract need not be 
novel . . . .”); LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (noting that novelty is not required for 
ideas disclosed pursuant to an express or implied-in-fact contract in California); 
Ronald Caswell, Comment, A Comparison and Critique of Idea Protection in California, New 
York, and Great Britain, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 717, 723 (1992) (“Under Cali-
fornia’s [quasi-contract] analysis, it is irrelevant whether an idea contains the element 
of novelty.”). 
132 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 461-63 (6th Cir. 2001) (predict-
ing that Michigan courts would follow the California approach); Reeves v. Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1141 (Alaska 1996) (adopting the California approach). 
133 The leading novelty case in New Jersey, Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 258 A.2d 153, 
156-57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969), aff’d, 275 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1971), favors no novelty prerequisite in the contractual framework.  The recent case of 
Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 788 A.2d 906, 914-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), 
cert. granted and summarily remanded, 796 A.2d 893 (N.J. 2002), deviated from Flemming and 
demonstrated a willingness to adopt such a novelty standard.  Johnson, however, has since 
been remanded (in light of the plaintiff ’s receipt of a patent) and thus no longer repre-
sents controlling law.  Hence, the New Jersey courts have an opportunity to reconsider 
the issue.  See LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486-87 (suggesting that New Jersey courts take 
this opportunity to “carve out a more thoughtful approach” to idea law). 
134 Miller, supra note 60, at 730-32. 
135 See id. (summarizing the overarching problems with the current state of idea-
law doctrine).  Professor Miller believes that because of the modern significance of 
ideas for a wide range of businesses and industries, the law should grant greater pro-
tection to ideas, especially in light of the need to stay competitive in a global market 
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5.  Summary 
Thus far, we have reviewed the various federal and state bodies of 
law that pertain to innovation.  In theory, patent protection offers the 
strongest protection by affording exclusivity against the rest of the 
world, including inventors who independently come up with the pro-
tected invention, for a period of twenty years from the date of filing.136
The expense and difficulty associated with securing and enforcing pat-
ent protection, however, undermine the effectiveness of patent pro-
tection for many inventions.  Moreover, recent developments have nar-
rowed the range of innovations that are eligible for patent protection. 
Trade secrecy is another important source of legal protection for 
innovation.137  The subject matter of trade secret law is much broader 
than the subject matter of patent law, but the protection provided by 
trade secret law is weaker than patent protection.  Although in princi-
ple trade secret law covers all types of information, one cannot rely on 
trade secrecy with respect to information that may be readily dis-
cerned from the design of products and processes and information 
that may be extracted via reverse engineering.  Furthermore, while 
trade secret law purports to protect the employer’s tacit information, 
in reality employers who seek to assert their rights against former em-
ployees are rarely successful, except in evident cases involving actual 
appropriation of documents by the employee. 
Copyright law also affords some protection to innovation, albeit 
indirectly.138  Copyright protection is limited to the expression of in-
novation, rather than the innovation itself, and it is subject to some 
broad exceptions and exemptions that may adversely affect the inno-
vator.  The work-made-for-hire doctrine in copyright law protects em-
ployers to some extent against disclosure by ex-employees concerning 
the employee innovation.  But since copyright protection does not ex-
tend to ideas and concepts, and only to the expression thereof, the 
protection that it affords to former employers is very limited when the 
idea or concept may be expressed in multiple ways. 
Naked ideas are offered a very minimal level of protection in our 
legal system.139  Such ideas cannot be protected under patent or copy-
that creates alternative markets for ideas for American and foreign idea vendors.  See
id. at 705-06. 
136 See supra subsection II.A.1. 
137 See supra subsection II.A.2. 
138 See supra subsection II.A.3. 
139 See supra subsection II.A.4. 
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right law.  They enjoy a certain degree of protection under trade se-
cret law, as well as under certain state law doctrines providing direct 
protection to ideas. 
B. Indirect Protection of Innovation:  CNCs 
As explained above, the direct legal protection afforded to innova-
tion is limited.140  In the employment context, these limited direct 
modes of protection are supplemented by indirect modes of protec-
tion:  employers rely on legal doctrines that protect information by re-
straining departing employees from using knowledge obtained at 
their firms.  These doctrines include, among others, breach of a duty 
of loyalty, unfair competition, breach of nondisclosure agreements, 
and, most importantly, covenants not to compete. 
Covenants not to compete forbid an employee from competing 
with an employer for a certain period of time after the termination of 
employment, typically one or two years, within a limited geographic 
area related to the employer’s market.  By restricting employee mobil-
ity, such covenants limit knowledge spillovers and indirectly protect 
employers’ information. 
In most states, covenants not to compete are enforceable if they are 
not unreasonable and excessive in duration or geographical scope.141
The importance of covenants not to compete is growing, as more and 
more employees are required to sign them.142  Lawsuits for breach of 
covenants not to compete have become common and are currently 
among the most frequently litigated issues in employment law.143
Historically, courts were reluctant to enforce covenants not to 
compete because of the disparities in bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees, as well as the effect that the covenants have on 
employees’ ability to make a living.  Likewise, courts were concerned 
140 See supra Section II.A. 
141 See Hyde, supra note 94, at 30. 
142 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:  Disputes over the Ownership of Hu-
man Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 738-39 (2002) (“Covenants 
not to compete and covenants not to disclose information have become commonplace 
in employment contracts over the past ten years.  In addition to their increased pres-
ence in negotiated, fixed-term employment contracts, such covenants have also been 
inserted into at-will employment relationships.”). 
143 See id. at 739 (tracking the increase of litigation involving covenants not to 
compete in decisions available on Westlaw). 
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about the adverse effects of CNCs on employee mobility, the labor 
market, and trade in general.144
Over time, however, courts warmed to CNCs and adopted a “rule 
of reason” approach to their enforcement.  Under this standard, 
courts enforce CNCs of reasonable duration and geographic coverage, 
as they neither constrain employee mobility beyond what is necessary 
to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests nor contradict 
the public interest.  The definition of reasonableness varies among 
states and between cases. 
Traditionally, courts applied a higher level of scrutiny to CNCs in 
at-will employment relationships.  Courts employed various tests to en-
sure that employees who could be terminated at will had received 
valid consideration in return for signing the covenant not to com-
pete.145  This higher standard of review in cases involving termination 
at will has largely eroded in recent years.  And while there are still 
courts that decline to enforce covenants not to compete in cases of 
unjustified dismissal, ignoring the at-will clause, other courts readily 
enforce them even in such cases.146
It is noteworthy that the courts have contributed to the wide-
spread use of CNCs by developing a practice of rewriting invalid cove-
nants and then enforcing the modified terms, rather than rejecting 
the entire covenant as courts did in the past.147  Over time, courts have 
also expanded the list of employer interests that justified enforcement 
of covenants not to compete.  In the past, CNCs were only enforced if 
a trade secret of the employer was at stake; today, many courts have 
abandoned that requirement.148  For example, in most states, courts 
regularly enforce CNCs to protect a former employer’s customer list, 
even if the list is not secret.149  Similarly, courts have recently enforced 
covenants not to compete in cases where the employer paid for an 
employee’s training on the ground that the employer is entitled to 
prevent the employee from using the skills that she acquired in the 
144 See id. at 740. 
145 See id. at 742 (explaining that one test is whether the CNC is “ancillary to an 
otherwise valid transaction”). 
146 See id. at 743-44 (discussing the various courts’ responses to CNCs in cases of 
unjustified dismissal). 
147 See id. at 744 (“The current approach of a majority of courts is either to rewrite 
an invalid covenant and enforce it as rewritten or to delete the invalid portions and 
enforce the remainder.”). 
148 See id. at 747 (noting this expansion and the elimination of the trade secret  
requirement). 
149 See id. at 749. 
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training while employed by a competitor, even though no trade se-
crets were disclosed to the trainee.150
An important exception to the modern trend of enforcing CNCs 
is California.  California law provides that “every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind is to that extent void.”151  The courts have inter-
preted this law broadly to invalidate CNCs.152
Professor Gilson has argued that California’s reluctance to en-
force CNCs accounts for the rise of Silicon Valley relative to high-tech 
centers in other states, such as Route 128 in Massachusetts.153  Profes-
sor Gilson explained that the unenforceability of CNCs led to knowl-
edge spillovers and information sharing, which generated consider-
able agglomeration effects and increased the innovative capacity of 
the high technology sector.154
CONCLUSION
The organization of innovation can be based on property rights, 
on verifiable contractual provisions (CNCs), on access that is con-
trolled or limited by law (trespass) or technology, and on reputation.  
In this Article, we have focused on the first three organizational forms.  
Specifically, we analyzed how the availability and scope of different 
kinds of legal protection to innovation delineates the boundary be-
tween firm and market in the high-tech industry. 
Although we did not engage in an in-depth analysis of reputation-
based organization of innovation, we recognize this possibility and its 
importance.  As Professors Burk and McDonnell warned, one must be 
cautious not to overstate the role of property rights or forms of legal 
protection in business settings, since nonlegal mechanisms, such as 
business norms, expectations, and reputation, play a significant role in 
such environments.155  We agree. 
Reputation can be an effective substitute for organization, and it 
can cure problems of uncontractability.  For example, many of the 
150 See id. at 751 (discussing the courts’ recent focus on “who pays” for the training 
as a justification for enforcing CNCs in such circumstances). 
151 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16,600 (West 2008). 
152 See Hyde, supra note 94, at 29-30 (observing that CNCs have been unenforce-
able in California for over a century because of this statute). 
153 Gilson, supra note 89, at 578. 
154 Id. at 578-79. 
155 Burk & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 602. 
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contracting challenges that we discussed will not arise if buyers or fi-
nanciers of innovation have a strong reputation for not stealing oth-
ers’ ideas.  Likewise, a research unit famous for its innovative capabili-
ties may be able to secure financing for its projects even without fully 
disclosing them to financiers—or at the very least, may get the latter to 
sign an NDA.  Correspondingly, an employer who establishes for her-
self a reputation for generously rewarding employees for innovation 
will be spared many of the contracting problems that we addressed.  
Perhaps the best example of the significance of reputation is provided 
by venture-capital firms.156  Venture-capital firms with established 
reputations can (and do) assuage Arrow’s disclosure paradox.  Thanks 
to their reputation, such firms can on many occasions gain access to 
unprotected information generated by innovators. 
The requisite level of reputation that can form a substitute for le-
gal protection is not easy to attain, however.  Transactions over inno-
vation are characterized by a high degree of suspicion and initial mis-
trust.  Innovators are wary about disclosing their innovations for fear 
that the information will leak to others.  Buyers and financiers of in-
novation, for their part, will be reluctant to transact without full dis-
closure since most innovations are commercially valueless.  Given that 
reputation usually results from repeated behavior over time, it may be 
very difficult to build a good reputation in this environment. 
156 We thank Phil Weiser for pointing out this example to us. 
